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 ZONING REVIEW AND DUE PROCESS
Recently the Virginia Supreme Court has
handed down some very interesting and start-
ling zoning decisions. The Virginia Court
for the most part is now finding zoning ord-
inances as applied to individual property
owners invalid as being arbitrary and capri-
cious. The basis for these decisions as seen
in the language of the Court is apparently a
due process argument. The analysis by the
Virginia Court is not in the vein of proced-
ural due process as has been the case in some
recent decisions. See, Fasano v. Board of
County Commissioners-of Washinaton County,
507 P.2d 23 (Ore. 1973) and "Recent Cases
in Zoning," ENP Vol. 2, no. 1 (Nov. 1976),
p. 5. It seems the Virginia Court is esta-
blishing a unique due process analysis. The
only purpose of this article is to show the
tip of the iceberg, but there is a more thor-
ough discussion and solution offered in a
note entitled "Zoning, Planning and the Scope
of Judicial Review in Virginia" 25 Am. L. Rev.
497 (1975).
The leading cases have centered around
Fairfax County which is probably the fastest
growing county in the State, but the cases
certainly have state wide, and perhaps nat-
ional effect, so they should not be treated
as parochial in nature. The first signifi-
cant case developing this new position was
Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v.
Snell Co Corp., 214 Va. 655 (1974).
Here, the newly elected Board of Supervis-
ors, which had been elected to slow the coun-
ty's rapid growth, moved on its own to rezone
certain parcels of land which had the effect
of piecemeal down-zoning, The trial court
adopted the position that such zoning would
be valid If there was a substantial change
in circumstances or a mistake, but since the
county had shown neither of these then the
legislation was invalid. The Virginia Su-
preme Court accepted that position, but it
went on to say that piecemeal down-zoning
would have the following effect on the pre-
sumption of legislative validity.
"Where presumptive reasonableness
is challenged by probative evidence
of unreasonableness, the challenge
must be met by some evidence of reas-
onableness. If evidence of reason-
ableness is sufficient to make the
question fairly debatable, the ordin-
ance must be sustained. If not, the
evidence of unreasonableness defeats
the presumption of reasonableness
and the ordinance cannot be sustain-
ed." 214 Va. at 659.
Normally a court in judging legislative
validity would apply the "fairly debatable"
test by upholding the legislation if there
was any reasonable purpose for the legisla-
tion whether presented in evidence or not,
see Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926). Very little violence is com-
mitted to this test if applied only to cases
of piecemeal down-zoning, but the Virginia
Court did not stop there.
The next significant case is Board of
Supervisore of Fairfax County v. Allman,
15 Va. 434 (1975). Here the landowners
asked for rezoning of a little over 300 acres
from single family dwellings on one acre lots
to multi-family use in planned development
units. This would have the effect of raising
otential family units on the property from
73 to'988. After the Board refused to re-
zone, the landowners challenged the ordinance
and the trial court found it arbitrary and
capricious. The petitioning landowners ar-
gued that the more intense land use would.
conform to the Master Plant that the value
of the property was worth considerably more
if rezonedl that public facilities were a-
vailable, or could be built, and that there
had been discrimination because similarly
situated property nearby had been granted
rezoning to higher uses. The County respond-
ed by arguing presumption of legislative
validity. Also the defendants argued that
public facilities were inadequate at present
and that the intention of the Board was to
permit rezoning as the facilities became
available. *The Board had rezoned nearby
property but those rezonings were to fill
n areas around Reston, an already built-up
area. One other property of a little over
64 acres which was obviously a much smaller
area had also been rezoned. The Board claim-
ed such rezonings had been a mistake,
The Virginia Supreme Court took great
pains to point out all the facts which.sup-
ported the lower court's findings. There
was evidence that the landowners could make
substantially more money if the property were
developed at a higher density. Although the
fire protection would be substandard, it
would be the same as existed in other areas
of the county, and the court believed that
It was no obstacle to rezoning. The effect
would be to increase the number of people
with substandard fire protection or the coun-
ty would need to correct the matter by a
large outlay of capital improvement funds
all at once. In either case it denied the
county the ability to upgrade fire protec-
tion, and protect the public safety in an
orderly manner through zoning. The court
also pointed out that the sewage system was
in fact available. This had the effect of
saying that the county's plans of sewer
development must give way to a first come
first serve basis. The court also found
that the school facilities would be adequate
since "ItIhis could be done, Whitworth a
school official testified, by an accelera-
ted building program, temporary classrooms,
extending the school day, going on a double
shift, realignment of school district lines
and transporting children from congested
areas to areas where'there were vacant or
unfilled classrooms" (215 Va, at 438). One
of the most interesting aspects of the dec-
islon was the use of the master plan against
the county. Since the master plan showed
that the rezoning was to be made at some time,
the court held that the change should take
place now, This could well put a chill on
future land use plans designed for years in
the future. Another argument that was given
great weight was that the similarly situated
property owners, as the Virginia Court called
them, had been granted rezonings. The court
called all of this "inconsistent and discrim-
inatory" and then curiously went on to say
that this ". . . discriminatory action is an
arbitrary and capricious action" (215 Va. at
445). The court then quoted the passage
above from its earlier decision that the leg-
islative presumption of validity had been
overcome by probative evidence that the coun-
ty had failed to offer evidence to establish
reasonableness of the ordinance.
The next case was Board of Sunervisors
of Fairfax CountVv. Williams, 216 Va. 49 •
(1975). Again the landowners wanted their
property rezoned to a higher residential use,
the Board refused, the owners made a chal-
lenge, and the trial court found the ordin-
ance arbitrary and capricious. The trial
court made findings that (1) the public fac-
ilities were or soon would be availablet (2)
nearby similarly situated property had al-
ready been rezoned; (3) existing zoning of
the land in question was unreasonable (since
the land could be developed more profitably
with .a higher land use)i and (4) the zoning
was discriminatory and therefore arbitrary
and capricious. This case was very similar
to the previous case but with two additional
attributes. First the master plan specifi-
cally called for development over a period
of time, but this did not help; the ordin-.
ance was still held invalid. second, the
Virginia Supreme Court in upholding the
trial court said. "We are of opinion Isil
that the record supports each and every one
of these findings of the trial court." (216
Va. at 58). The Virginia Supreme Court, as
in the previous case, went over the evidence
in detail and then upheld the lower court,
since the evidence supported the lower court's
opinion.
The formula for a new rule of zoning
review laid down by the Virginia Supreme
Court seems to go something like this, if
(1) petitioners challenging a local zoning
ordinance present probative evidence of dis-
crimination, then (2) the burden shifts to
the locality to present evidence of reason-
ableness. This (3) permits the court, no
matter what lip service it pays to legisla-
tive presumption, the opportunity to weigh
the evidence in a balancing test to deter-
mine if the ordinance is arbitrary and
capricious, and (4) on review the Virginia
Supreme Court will determine if the evidence
supports the findings of the trial court.
On the surface this appears to be an
orderly testo but unfortunately there are
a number of difficulties with each step that
ought to be treated one at a time. The step
which opens with evidence of discrimination
follows the familiar path of an equal protec-
tion argument. However, landowners of
Fairfax County or of Virginia for that mat-
ter are hardly a "suspect" class, and there
Is no fundamental right which is in issue.
.The United States Supreme Court in a zoning
case, has said as much through Mr. Justice
"Douglas. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1 (1974). In the absence of a
suspect class or a fundamental right the
question of discrimination is illusory, be-
cause every act of the legislature is dis-
criminatory in some manner, since legisla-
tures deal in classifications. Mr. Justice
Douglas in the same case observed that in
the areas of economic and social legislation
the legislatures have historically drawn
lines (46 U.S. at 415). In the second
step of the analysis, where the burden
shifts to the localities, there occurs an
interesting addition to the rules surround-
ing presumption of legislative validity.
The Virginia Court appears to be treating
the presumption as it would an evidentiary
presumption which permits one party to win
until the other party presents rebutting
evidence, and the burden shifts to the first
arty to present evidence or lose. Normally,
t is necessary for the petitioner who is
attacking an ordinance to show that it is
unreasonable. If the law is unreasonable,
it is invalid. It is not necessary for the
defendant to show reasonableness. Euclid v
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.s. 365 (1926).
Under step (3) in the analysis, if the
matter becomes a duel of evidence then in
fact the court becomes a fact finder which
will weigh the evidence, And in such delib-.
erations there is the clear danger that the
court will substitute its Judgment for that
of the legislature. There are in Virginia
at least seven purposes for zoning which the
locality is mandated to take into considera-
tion. Va. Code Ann. 15.1-489 (1975). In
deciding what course to follow it becomes
necessary for the locality to choose which
criteria is to receive greater weight and
how each property is to fit into the scheme.
In fact the locality is engaged in drawing
discriminatory lines, but the question is
who is better equipped to make those dec-
isions -- the court or the locality. If
localities are forced to permit development
by allowing use of public facilities on a
first come, first serve, basis there will
be chaos. If the localities are forced to
expend revenue, and also tax by court order,
so as to permit development, then there is
little use in drawing up orderly master
plans and passing zoning ordinances. The
final step in the Virginia Court's analysis
is perhaps the most interesting and telling
point. The Virginia Supreme Court's review
of the trial court will only go to determine
if the evidence supports the findings. This
indicates that the trial court is engaged
in weighing evidence by balancing to deter-
mine the validity of the legislation, ano
the Virginia Supreme Court will not look
for itself to see whether circumstances and
conditions are such that the validity of the
classification is fairly debatable as it
should. See, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co..
272 U.S. W63 (1926).
It is difficult to determine what really
concerns the Virginia Supreme Court. The
court seems to be legitimately concerned
about due process. Especially evident, in
the cases, is a desire to see that low and
moderate income families are not excluded
by zoning, but this is certainly a peculiar
way to go about assuring such an end. Fur-
ther, the analysis leaves the localities in
an uncertain position as to any outcome of a
zoning challenge.
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